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  1ABSTRACT 
 
Little empirical work exists measuring if interagency collaborations delivering 
public services produce better outcomes, and none looking inside the black box at 
collaboration management practices. We examine whether there are collaboration 
management practices associated with improved performance of Crime and Disorder 
Reduction Partnerships, a crossagency collaboration in England and Wales. These exist 
in every local authority in England and Wales,
  so there are enough of them to permit 
quantitative analysis. And their aim is crime reduction, and crime data over time are 
available, allowing actual results (rather than perceptions or self-reports) to be analyzed 
longitudinally. We find that there are management practices associated with greater 
success at reducing crime, mostly exhibited through interaction effects such that the 
practice in question is effective in some circumstances but not others. Our findings 
support the arguments of those arguing that effective management of collaborations is 
associated with tools for managing any organization, not ones unique to managing 
collaborations:  if you want to be a good collaboration manager, you should be a good 
manager, period. 
 
 
KEYWORDS:  INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION, PARTNERSHIPS, GENERIC 
MANAGEMENT 
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  There is perhaps no topic in public management research where the level of 
interest is so high and the level of evidence so low as for cross-boundary collaborations.
*  
Interorganizational collaboration is regularly presented as one of the central features of 
contemporary public management: 
In the twenty-first century, interdependence and the salience of 
information have resulted in an environment where organizational and 
sectoral boundaries are more conceptual than actual, and collaborative 
managerial responses are required to complement, and in some cases even 
displace, bureaucratic processes.  (Agranoff and McGuire 2003: 2; see 
also Abramson et al. 2006; Kettl 2008)   
 
  At the same time, many have noted the paucity of empirical evidence about 
whether, or when, or how, such collaborations improve public outcomes. “The literature 
on collaboration,” write O’Leary et al. (2009: 6; see also Dickinson and Glasby 2010) “is 
often celebratory and only rarely cautious.” Regarding environmental collaborations, 
Koontz and Thomas (2006: 111, emphasis in original) write, “[T]he most crucial question 
in collaborative environment management remains unanswered and, all too often, 
unasked:  To what extent does collaboration lead to improved environmental outcomes?”  
Regarding health collaborations, Lasker, Weiss, and Miller 2001: 181) state, “Funders 
and partners assume that collaboration will be more effective than efforts planned and 
carried out by a single organization or sector, yet there is little evidence that collaboration 
has improved health status or health systems in communities.” Geddes (2008: 204) notes 
that in the U.K., the empirical location for this research, “Partnership has now been an 
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  3integral part of urban and regional development since at least the early 1990s, but this 
orthodoxy continues to conceal concerns about the effectiveness of partnerships from the 
point of view of policy-makers and practitioners.” With some irony, Huxham and Vangen 
(2005: 60) observe that “reports of unmitigated [collaboration] success are not common.”   
  This paper presents empirical evidence about whether there are management 
practices associated with the effectiveness of an interagency collaboration in England and 
Wales, called Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRP’s), in reducing crime.  
CDRP’s were established by the Crime and Disorder Act of 1998 and required in every 
local government (called “local authority”) area in England and Wales.
1  CDRP’s are a 
collaboration consisting mostly of government organizations – the police (which are 
organizationally autonomous from local government), the Probation Service (a central 
government organization working mostly with recently released prisoners), the Youth 
Offending Service (also a central government organization dealing with young people at 
risk of crime), the Fire Service (also an autonomous local organization), local 
government service organizations (such as street lighting, parks, and inspectional 
services), and a number of other organizations, often including the voluntary sector.
2 
  Partnerships such as CDRP’s have been common in the U.K. (Sullivan and 
Skelcher 2002; 6 et al. 2002), where they have often been conceptualized (Lowndes and 
Skelcher 1998; Glendinning, Powell, and Rummery, 2002) as an alternative to both 
central bureaucracies and markets as a governance method. Sullivan and Skelcher report 
(Ibid.:  26-27) that around the beginning of the millennium, there were approximately 
5500 local or regional partnership bodies in the U.K. that were “stimulated or directly 
                                                 
1  A CDRP’s boundaries are co-terminous with the boundaries of the local authority. 
2  CDRP’s are not required to include organizations dealing with social problems such as employment.  
  4created by government,” in sixty different policy domains (such as local economic 
development, health, and education), with three-quarters of their funding provided by the 
national government;  during 1999 the word “partnership” was used 6197 times in 
Parliament, compared to 38 times a decade earlier (Ling 2002).  One recent textbook on 
local government in the U.K. (Wilson and Game 2006: 18) states that “[p]artnership 
working has become a central feature of today’s local government.” 
There are, of course, different kinds of interorganizational collaborations, with 
different purposes. Some are entirely inside the public sector, while others involve public 
organizations working with private ones (Agranoff 2007; Klijn 2008; Sandfort and 
Milward 2008). CDRP’s are one kind.  They are, first, mostly inside government, rather 
than public-private partnerships. Second, their purpose is service delivery, rather than 
simply information-sharing among organizations with overlapping missions or conflict 
resolution among contending parties. Other examples involving these two features would 
be multiagency case management for poor families, or joint agency efforts to manage 
ecosystems or identify terrorists (Gans and Horton 1975; Thomas 2003; Zegart 2009).  
  We know of only a few empirical papers trying to measure if interagency 
collaborations delivering public services produce better outcomes, and none looking 
inside the black box at collaboration management practices.  Jennings and Ewalt (1998) 
find a modest relationship between degree of “administrative coordination” in state-level 
job training programs (involving several agencies, and often private participants) and 
some, but not all, measures of job success performance. Ryu and Rainey (2009) compare 
job training programs with one-stop shopping capabilities with those without, concluding 
the former produce somewhat better outcomes.  Page (2003) notes that outcomes for 
  5children’s services in Georgia and Vermont improved subsequent to interagency 
collaborations, but points out that the improvement corresponded to a major national 
economic upswing; he also cites a consulting study for Georgia concluding that 
introduction of collaboration measures was followed by improvements. Just about all the 
other few discussions using performance as a dependent variable (e.g. Chen 2010) 
employ self-reported perceptions of participants as success measures.  
CDRP’s provide a rare opportunity for empirical research on whether there ways 
interagency collaborations are managed and led that are associated with improved social 
outcomes. First, by statute they exist -- with similar memberships, responsibilities, and 
powers -- in every local authority in England and Wales,
 3 so there are enough of them  to 
permit quantitative analysis. Second, their aim is crime reduction, and crime data over 
time are available at the local authority level, allowing actual results (rather than 
perceptions or self-reports) to be analyzed.  This combination is seldom available for 
research on collaborations – indeed, it is seldom available in public management research 
in general. Since CDRP’s exist in all local authorities, our research strategy will not be to 
compare places with collaborations and those without, but rather to exploit variation in 
management practices across CDRP’s to see whether any are associated with improved 
crime performance. Thus, we seek to look inside the CDRP black box. 
  At least compared with many collaborations, CDRP’s have significant capacity, 
making them a best-case scenario for success, at least in the world of interagency 
collaboration as it currently exists. They are managed through what Provan and Milward 
1995 call a “network administrative organization” – a dedicated unit, with its own staff 
and managers, separate from constituent agencies in the CDRP. CDRP’s also frequently 
                                                 
3   Initially there were 376 of them, although the number has been reduced to 372 by mergers. 
  6organize cross-agency initiatives the CDRP runs itself.  By statute, the CDRP, not any 
component agency, is responsible for recommending so-called “anti-social behavior 
orders,” restrictions aimed at disruptive people (mostly youth) establishing individualized 
limitations on people with whom or streets where they may congregate.  Some CDRP’s 
also run “warden” programs; wardens, who have no arrest powers, patrol neighborhoods 
to provide additional official presence and learn more about crime problems. Other 
examples of CDRP-run programs include collaborations between police and local 
regulatory agencies against illegal liquor purchases or pawnshops dealing in fenced 
goods, efforts to put gates in alleyways to inhibit entry of burglars, and police and 
probation programs to watch “prolific and persistent” offenders. CDRP’s had also, at the 
end of the period for which we gather data, been in existence for almost a decade.  
HYPOTHESES 
There are many reasons why it is difficult to get collaborations to work well – 
different cultures and priorities among participant organizations, worry about time taken 
away from an organization’s main work, fears of being held accountable for actions not 
under an individual organization’s control (see Bardach 1998 for a summary of these 
challenges). Furthermore, compared to both hierarchies and markets, collaborations have 
fewer tools available to influence the behavior of participants (Williamson 1975; Powell 
1990). Hence the proposition of Bryson and Crosby (2008):  “The normal expectation 
ought to be that [collaboration] success will be very difficult to achieve.” 
The literature on managing collaborations is filled with statements about practices 
purported to be associated with success, with little or no evidence to establish a 
relationship (Agranoff 2007; Hibbert, Huxham, and Ring 2008).  Furthermore, the 
  7literature is laden with platitudes: “What might be surprising to practitioners looking for 
new insights is just how few specific and practical ‘tricks’ are actually offered that are 
not at some level common sense” (6 et al. 2002: 128); one book, called Making 
Collaboration Work (Wondolleck and Yaffie 2000: 123, 149, 159), for example, 
recommends collaboration managers adopt “a flexible, positive attitude,” “commitment 
to a collaborative process,” and that they work at “fostering understanding.” 
A useful way to categorize managerial techniques for collaborations is to 
distinguish between those associated with management in general (originally developed 
for single, hierarchical organizations) and those of collaborative management in 
particular  (unique to or at least specially characteristic of collaborations).  The literature 
has focused considerably more on techniques of the latter sort. The Mattessich and 
Monsey (1992) literature review, for example, included no studies mentioning tools of 
management in general, possibly because these had been studied and found to be 
unimportant, but more likely because they hadn’t been tested at all.  
  The lack of attention to use of techniques of management in general relates, of 
course, to the relatively limited ability of collaboration managers to use them. “The most 
obvious difference between a confederation of organizations and a single organization is 
that confederations lack strong central authority.” (Litwak and Rothman 1970: 137)  
Generally, participation is voluntary. Even in CDRP's, where formal participation of 
some agencies is legally mandated, engagement cannot be commanded. Collaborations 
lack formal authority to assign and direct work, except for a partnership’s own staff, that 
is the distinguishing hallmark of the employment relationship in a hierarchy (Barnard 
1938; Williamson 1975), as well as tools associated with human-resource management 
  8(hiring, promotion, firing), though these are generally weaker in government than firms. 
Collaborations seldom sign binding contracts with member organizations, which might 
specify commitments in exchange for something. Thus, “[I]nterorganizational analysis 
will frequently use, as explanatory variables, elements that are disregarded or minimized 
in intraorganizational studies.” (Litwak and Hylton 1962:  398)   
There is a minority strand in the literature. Thatcher (2004: 93) disagrees with the 
view that collaborations “are radically different from conventional organizations,” 
referring to them as “inchoate hierarchies.”  Bardach (1998: 21) argues that 
“interorganizational collaborative capacity is very much like an organization in its own 
right.” The empirical work of Milward and Provan (1995; see also Provan and Kenis 
2008) argues that more centralized networks tend to perform better. Alternatively, given 
the presence in single organizations of stovepipes with distinct cultures and often-weak 
controls across them, of the relatively weaker strength of hierarchical tools in government 
compared to firms, and of non-hierarchical ways of leading that have been promoted in a 
single-organizational context, one might argue that hierarchies in government share 
features of collaborations (Page 2003; McGuire 2006). Rodrigeuz, Langley, and Beland 
(2007) argue collaborations are more likely to succeed if they mix hierarchical and other 
tools. Moynihan (2005) notes that successful emergency management involves a mixture 
of collaboration and command-and-control. 
In particular, we note a distinction between “front-end” tools of hierarchical 
management – such as hiring, task assignment, and work direction – and “back-end” ones 
such as performance measurement, followup, and promotion/dismissal.  When thinking 
about hierarchical management, people often think mostly about front-end tools, which 
  9are those collaborations don’t have available. However, collaborations do have available 
many back-end tools, albeit not promotion/dismissal (keeping in mind that hierarchies in 
government seldom in practice have dismissal tools either). Furthermore, some 
collaborations have an ability to access external funds, and also the support of managers 
outside the collaboration who do have hierarchical authority over collaboration members; 
gaining access to such resources may increase a collaboration’s hierarchical authority by 
giving the it incentives it can use to induce member cooperation. Taken together, the 
availability to collaborations of some hierarchical tools may thus be underestimated. 
Since the tools potentially available to collaborations are a subset of hierarchical tools as 
a whole, we will together call these “hierarchy light.” 
Some of the most-common management tools hypothesized to be associated with 
collaboration success appear below, 15 in all.
4 We hypothesize that prioritizing the 
practice, compared with other tools the manager could use, reduces crime.  Each practice 
may be seen as a “treatment”; we look at the effect of each on crime. The first group are 
associated with collaborative management in particular.  The second are tools of 
management in general. The third -- managing outward -- is discussed widely in literature 
on managing single organizations in government (Moore 1995; Heymann 1987), and thus 
are tools of public management in general. 
(1) Promoting voluntary cooperation  
 a.  Building Trust:  The view that collaborations are very different from 
hierarchies tends to be associated with the suggestion that building trust is a central 
                                                 
4  These are taken from literature discussing not only the kind of interagency service-delivery 
collaborations most similar to CDRP’s, but also from discussions of other kinds of collaborations such as 
information-sharing networks inside government or cross-sectoral collaborations. We also undertook  
exploratory in-person interviews with CDRP managers where we asked them to talk about their jobs. 
  10management priority, since this is needed to overcome distrust that hinders voluntary 
cooperation (Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Thatcher 2004). Such distrust in turn grows 
from different cultures and predominant missions among participating agencies, where 
each organization can easily come to see the others in “outgroup” terms, subject to 
negative stereotyping (Sherif et al 1961; Tajfel et al 1971; Turner et al 1987).   
  For CDRP’s, the major cultural clashes would be between police on the one hand, 
and probation, drug treatment, and at-risk youth agencies on the other, where police often 
see the latter as “pro-offender” and non-police groups often see police as ignoring social 
causes of crime. Until the mid-1990’s U.K. probation officers were required to have 
social work degrees (Nash 2004). Those working with young addicts “see part of their 
role as client advocacy and support” and don’t even want to share information with youth 
offending agencies (Minkes and Raynor 2005). In one survey from the 1990’s of English 
police and probation officers (Crawford 1997), 84% of police – but only 10% of 
probation officials – felt that “too lenient sentences” had a considerable impact on crime, 
while 45% of probation officials – but only 10% of police – felt poverty did.
5 
  In response to these kinds of issues, probably no other collaboration management 
technique is more widely discussed than trust building. A review (Mattesich and Monsey 
1992) examining 18 studies on success factors for collaborations found that creating 
“mutual respect, understanding, and trust” appeared more often than any other (see also 
                                                 
5  Likewise, 71% of probation officers (compared to 2% of police) listed anti-discrimination policies as one 
of the five most-effective crime prevention methods, and 41% listed employment/job-creation schemes 
(compared to 3%);  44% of probation officers (and 83% of police) listed more police on the beat, and 12% 
(versus 33%) surveillance cameras.  A similar problem occurs when social service organizations 
representing different professions try to coordinate services:  “Different professions develop different 
perspectives about the main problems affecting the multiple-problem client.” (Aiken et al 1975: 19) 
 
  11Crislip and Larson 1994; Smith, Carroll, and Ashford 1995; Bardach 1998; Linden 2002; 
Shortell et al 2002; Huxham and Vangen 2005; Thomson, Perry, and Miller 2008).   
 b.  Sharing power and workload equitably:  To build trust, some (Huxham and 
Vangen 2005; see also Bryson and Crosby 2008) argue that fair treatment of partners, 
particularly less-powerful ones, is essential.  In a private-sector interorganizational 
collaboration context (e.g. Ring and Van de Ven 1992; Chung, Singh, and Lee 2000) 
have argued that collaboration is more likely to be successful among organizations with 
relatively equal power. In collaborations, “[M]anaging the inequality between principal 
and subsidiary members frequently becomes an issue.” (Huxham and Vangen 2005: 219)  
It is therefore important partnerships not be dominated by one group (Crislip and Larson 
1994; Linden 2002) and that workload be shared fairly so worries about free riding not 
deepen. These suggestions connect to literature (Tyler 1990) about the role of procedural 
fairness in gaining acceptance of decisions.  
(2)  Visionary leadership 
  Although literature on managing hierarchies has increasingly discussed visionary 
(Kotter 1990; Pfeffer 1992) or “transformational” (Burns 1978) leadership, which leads 
by inspiration more than command, this kind of leadership plays a more-prominent role 
in literature on collaborations, where command is less available (Mattesich and Monsey 
1992; Melaville and Blank 1993; Crislip and Larson 1994; Bardach 1998; Carley et al. 
2000; Lasker, Weiss, and Miller 2001; Linden 2002; Crosby and Bryson 2005; Gray 
2009).  “Determining a specific, easily articulated mission that reflects the interests of 
both individual organizational members and the large community partnership is an 
important characteristic of effective [collaboration] governance.” (Mitchell and Shortell 
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2000: 2)  Alexander et al. (2001: 165) see “vision-based leadership” as one of two 
essential management tools for partnerships.
(3)  Encouraging collaborative practices 
  Almost by definition, the raison d’etre for collaboration is to accomplish things 
jointly that could not be done at all, or as well, by organizations acting alone.  
Encouraging such behaviors might thus become management priorities on their own 
right. They might also be adopted on the idea that attitude follows behavior rather than 
the other way (e.g. Freedman and Fraser 1966), so the best way to create attitudes 
conducive to collaboration is to encourage behaviors associated with it. Thought of in this 
second way, this should be seen as another collaborative management tool.  
 a.  Information-sharing:  A prominent example of a collaborative practice is 
information sharing (6 et al 2007). A major argument for collaboration is that it 
encourages sharing information found in several partners, that is useful to undertaking a 
task (Kelman 2006).  In the context of collaboration across intelligence agencies, this is 
“connecting the dots”; for crime-reduction, it involves sharing knowledge about 
offenders that might exist, say, in police, youth offending, and probation organizations  
b.  Developing innovative local approaches:  Nowell (2010: 95) writes: 
A commonly represented vision of collaboration is the bringing together 
of multiple stakeholders who hold diverse perspectives on a problem 
thereby creating a forum for those perspectives to be identified, discussed, 
negotiated, and integrated. The result of this process is ideally a collection 
of stakeholders that have a more holistic perspective on a given issue. 
…[This] is believed to serve as a foundation upon which new innovative 
solutions can be identified. 
 
As Thatcher (2004) notes, views of collaborations that underplay their hierarchical 
elements often emphasize them instead as fora for dialogue and learning among partners.   Here – as in team diversity literature emphasizing learning benefits of diversity 
(Horwitz and Horwitz 2007) – the suggestion is that the very range of cultures and 
approaches worrisome from a trust perspective produces synergy advantageous for 
learning.  “By combining the individual perspectives, resources, and skills of the partners, 
the group creates something new and valuable together. …Some people and 
organizations change when they are exposed to partners with different assumptions and 
methods of working.” (Lasker, Weiss, and Miller 2001: 184-85; see also Gray 1989; 
Bardach 1998; Rosenbaum 2002; Pollitt 2003).  Making development of innovative local 
anti-crime initiatives, separate from those promoted centrally, a management priority 
would represent an effort to take advantage of these special features of a collaboration. 
(4)  Followup and Delivery 
 a.  Getting partners to follow though on commitments:  Monitoring to check if 
people behave according to their commitments is a central feature of a manager’s role in 
classic theories of hierarchy. Fayol (1949, originally published 1918) characterized two 
central management jobs as command and control -- reflecting a cycle beginning with a 
manager giving subordinates assignments and ending with checking that these have been 
accomplished. These morphed into two elements in Gulick and Urwick’s (1936) 
elaboration of “POSDCORB,” under the monikers “directing” and “reporting.”  
Scholars emphasizing hierarchical elements of collaborations have noted this role 
as well. Though they emphasize mostly the benefits of centralization for reducing 
transaction costs of coordination inside a network, Milward and Provan also note (1995: 
24) that “monitoring and control over activities and outcomes by the core agency become 
possible once a network is centralized.” Thatcher (2004; see also Shortell et al 2002) 
  14states that partnerships must, to be successful, “get [people] to follow through on their 
commitments”; Milward and Provan (2006: 18) write that collaboration managers “have 
a major responsibility to ensure that those who participate in a network are responsible 
for their share of network activities and are held accountable for their actions.”   
b. Dealing with “blockages”:  Another common role discussed in literature on 
hierarchies is what Mintzberg (1973: 82, 85) calls “the manager as disturbance handler.” 
When subordinates cannot agree among themselves, they seek the help of 
the manager; when no one knows how to handle a difficulty, they pass it 
about until the manager gets it; when a crisis is perceived, the manager 
must take immediate charge. …[E]very manager must spend a good part 
of his time reacting very quickly to high-pressure disturbance situations. 
 
Boulding (1964; see also Galbraith 1973) argues that one of the central roles of hierarchy 
is to establish a mechanism for dealing with disputes that cannot be resolved at lower 
levels, and whose resolution is required for the organization to act.  This appears in 
POSDCORB as part of “coordinating.” 
We cannot locate any discussion in literature on collaboration management 
discussing this role. However, it came up frequently in the exploratory in-person 
interviews. The phrase generally used was dealing with “blockages” – crises, often 
involving conflicts among agencies, preventing some hoped-for activity from occurring. 
c. Performance measurement:  Starting in 2001 the U.K. central government 
established crime reduction targets. In 2005 these were assigned to CDRP’s, not just to 
the police.  Performance measurement appears as a control technique in the classical 
hierarchy literature:  “The right to measure…results, and to specify what results are 
satisfactory…is the central component of managerial authority.” (Stinchcombe 1990: 58)  
  15More recently, use of performance measurement in individual public organizations has 
been widely discussed (e.g. Hatry 1999; Behn 2003; Moynihan, 2008).  
Performance measurement has received the greatest attention of all hierarchical-
style management tools in the collaboration literature (e.g. Shortell at al 2002; Linden 
2002; Page 2003; Bingham, Sandfort, and O’Leary 2008). Bardach (1998: 148, 173) 
notes that “[t]he language of results will help the participants focus on the underlying 
rationale” for collaboration; he also argues they serve as “an instrument both of threat and 
of setting challenging goals…(that creates) ‘a magnet for collaboration.’” 
(5)  Accessing Resources and Authority 
a. Accessing central government funds:  CDRP’s have potential access to several 
sources of central government funds that require application (as well as base funding on a 
formula basis)  Much of the early work on collaboration was written from a “resource 
dependence” perspective (Levine and White 1961; Benson 1975; Schermerhorn 1975; 
van de Ven 1976; Alter and Hage (1993; for crime partnerships, Liddle and Gelsthorpe 
1994; Rosenbaum 2002), arguing this was the most-important reason organizations 
collaborated with each other in the first place.  
When a collaboration seeks outside funds, it partly seeks to escape dilemmas of 
managing partner agencies by increasing resources the entity has available itself. 
Additionally, though, if collaboration entity itself can get access to resources individual 
agencies wouldn’t be able to obtain otherwise, this may build the collaboration’s 
authority over partners, creating a more hierarchical-type relationship. In the pithy phrase 
of one proponent of human services collaboration (quoted in Bardach 1998: 191; see also 
Gans and Horton 1975), “Nothing coordinates like cash.”  In a British context, it has been 
  16suggested that "[p]artnership working in practice consists of the temporary suppression of 
mutual loathing in the interests of mutual greed.” (Rowe and Devanny 2003: 375) The 
Mattesich and Monsey (1992) literature review found access to “sufficient funds” was 
one of the more-important factors explaining success.   
 b.  Pressing partners to contribute more staff effort:  An alternative way for a 
collaboration to gain resources is to implore partners to contribute them (often staff) to 
partnership activities.  This tool does not seem to have been discussed in the literature, 
but was mentioned in our in-person interviews.  Gaining staff resources would provide a 
partnership with people over whom it exercised some authority.   
 c.  Gaining local chief executive support:  The “chief executive” of a local 
authority is the senior career executive, analogous to a U.S. city manager. The chief 
executive has hierarchical authority over many agencies in a CDRP, though, importantly, 
not the police. Carley et al. (2000: 12) argue the chief executive, along with elected 
officials, are key in “drawing in reluctant partners” and encouraging their “genuine 
financial and human resource commitment.”  They also argue such involvement “bring(s) 
visibility to the partnership” and “provid(es) evidence of commitment at a senior level.”   
 d.  Resolving issues of allocating government funds: Outside funds can also be a 
source of conflict (Lowndes and Skelcher 1998). We hypothesize that prioritizing 
managing such conflicts takes away attention from more value-creating activities. 
(6)  Engaging the External Environment 
In collaboration literature, the Mattessich and Monsey review (1992; see also 
Crislip and Larson 1994; Milward and Provan 2006) found three studies (the minimum 
required for inclusion) concluding that a “favorable” political climate, where “political 
  17leaders, opinion-makers, persons who control resources, and the general public” support 
the collaboration’s mission, promoted success.  In one case study of a service delivery 
collaboration, Keast and Brown (2002) report the project foundered when it lost senior-
level political support. In terms of crime reduction specifically, political support might 
help by increasing community engagement in crime reduction. 
 a.  Gaining support from elected officials:  A central argument in Moore (1995) is 
that gaining support from elected officials is crucial for a public manager’s success, since 
the external environment provides legitimacy. This may be especially important in a 
partnership as a way of establishing quasi-hierarchical authority, and thus may also be 
seen as a hierarchy-light tool. However, McGuire and Sylvia (2009) found that county-
level emergency collaboration managers who reported to an elected official were 
somewhat less likely to perceive the collaboration as successful than those who didn’t. 
 b.  Gaining good media coverage:  Practitioner accounts (e.g. Linsky 1986; Haass 
1994) emphasize the importance of working with the media for government leader 
success. Interestingly, this is not discussed in literature on partnerships. For crime, good 
coverage may help by engaging the community and/or persuading potential criminals the 
authorities are effective at catching perpetrators or that social tolerance for crime is low. 
One might, however, argue attention to media is negatively related to crime reduction, on 
the view (Payne 1980, regarding elected officials) that managers prioritizing media are 
“show horses” rather than “work horses,” concerned about appearance over achievement. 
 b.  Gaining voluntary sector support:  Especially the British literature on 
partnerships pays significant attention to voluntary-sector involvement. Carley at al. 
(2000; see also Barr and Huxham 1996; Lee 1998; Gibbs 2001), discussing “urban 
  18regeneration” partnerships, argue voluntary sector involvement is important but difficult 
to achieve. In a police context, “community policing” (Skogan and Hartnett 1997) has 
emphasized the importance both of cross-organizational collaboration inside government 
and also involvement of local groups in crimefighting.  By contrast, Rosenbaum (2002), 
in a crime-reduction context, expresses skepticism about the value of community 
involvement, arguing such involvement may make partnerships too large and unwieldy, 
and hinder discussion of confidential information about offenders. 
DATA AND METHODS 
Dependent Variable 
For the period covered by this research, the U.K. central government established 
performance targets for crime reduction.  For 2001-04 these were to reduce vehicle crime 
by 30% and domestic burglary by 25%; there was an additional target to reduce robbery 
in ten “street crime initiative” areas (large cities) by 14% (Home Office 2003).  For 2005-
08, the target was a 15% reduction in the total number of crimes in nine categories of 
well-reported crimes –  to vehicle crime, burglary, and robbery were added assault, 
wounding, vehicle interference and tampering, bicycle theft, theft from the person,  and 
criminal damage (vandalism) (Home Office 2004). 
Our dependent variable is the 2008-09
6 crime rate by CDRP, aggregated for the 
nine crime categories of the 2005-08 target period, with lagged crime (2002-03) as one 
variable on the right-hand side. Crime data were provided by the Home Office from their 
                                                 
6  Through July 1. 
  19internal data system, and we used population data to calculate rates. We logarithmically 
transformed crime so we can interpret coefficients as percentage impacts.
7 
Since CDRP’s were formed in 1999, we would have liked to use crime data from 
that year, or earlier, as the baseline.  However, crime data at the CDRP level only began 
to be collected in fiscal year 2001-02. Furthermore, in 2002 a new reporting standard was 
developed that increased reported crime in 2002-03 by 10% compared with the previous 
methodology (Simmons, Legg, and Hosking 2003a).  More importantly (since a uniform 
increase in crime across all CDRP’s would not affect our results), the impact of the new 
standard varied by CDRP (Simmons, Legg, and Hosking 2003b), based both on when the 
new standard was implemented and on how much of a change it implied in previous 
practice. Additionally, in some jurisdictions, transition to reporting under the new system 
was not complete by the end of 2003.  There is therefore a tradeoff between using an 
earlier year as baseline, so as to maximize our ability to observe CDRP treatment effects, 
and using a later year, to improve data comparability between baseline and final years. 
Given this, we ran models using 2001-02, 2002-03, and 2003-04 as baselines. 
Substantive results (coefficients and p-values) were quite similar, but R2 was noticeably 
larger for 2002-03, and we therefore use this as our baseline for lagged crime. 
It is unlikely that CDRP’s, which were just getting established, would have 
produced effects on crime in their first three years. To the extent some CDRP effects may 
have already occurred by 2003, these will not be captured in our analysis, which makes 
any results conservative. And to the extent implementation of new reporting standards 
                                                 
7   To make results more intuitive, we reverse-coded crime, so a lower value (including a negative value if 
crime increased) means crime was higher. During this period, crime decreased in 69% of CDRP’s in our 
dataset; changes ranged from a decrease of 51% to an increase of 55%.   
 
  20was not complete in 2002-03, this introduces noise into our data and depresses p-values 
and coefficients, again making results conservative.  Finally, six of nine categories used 
for our dependent variable were not objects of targets until 2005, halfway through our 
measurement period. To the extent this meant CDRP’s initially paid less attention to 
reducing crime in these categories, again this makes results conservative. 
Independent Variables 
Data for our independent variables come from a survey conducted between May-
September 2008 of community safety managers (the title of the person running the CDRP 
network administrative organization) in England and Wales. It was thus conducted 
towards the end of our measurement period, raising the question – to which we return  
later – about the extent to which reported priorities applied throughout the period, and 
whether this creates problems for our results. 
The survey was conducted through, and with endorsement of, the National 
Community Safety Network, the association of these managers. It was initiated by an 
email explaining the purpose of the research and inviting the recipient to link to an online 
survey. Of the 372 CDRP’s, emails were sent to 339 managers.
8 If the manager reported 
being in post less than one year, we aborted the survey, requesting the recipient provide 
contact information for the predecessor. Four reminders were sent, after which efforts 
were made to interview by telephone.
9 This produced 203 completed surveys (102 online 
and 101 by telephone
10). Excluding 26 managers not in post long enough and unable to 
help locate their predecessor, the response rate was 65%. 
                                                 
8  For the rest, either no address could be obtained, or they bounced back because of a incorrect addresses. 
9  The telephone survey was conducted in January-February 2009. 
10  Phone interviews were not completed for the following reasons:  (1) 82 no answer or no reply to 
voicemail after 6 attempts; (2) 27 refused (6) 21 requested Internet survey link but then didn’t respond. 
  21The survey had a large number of questions; data for our independent variables 
come from one of them, in which the manager was presented a list of 15 management 
practices. (Exact question wordings appear in Table One.) The list was introduced with 
the following statement:  “The following is a list of possible management priorities for a 
Community Safety Manager. For each of the factors listed, please tick the box that best 
describes how important each priority has been for you personally as a Community 
Safety Manager.” (emphasis in original)  The choices were:  (1) “This is a top priority,” 
(2) “This is important to me,” (3) “I pay some attention to this, but it’s not a real 
priority,” and (4) “This is not something I pay much attention to.”  If the respondent gave 
more than two practices the top rating, an instruction appeared on the screen to limit the 
number of top priorities to two.  (“Which of the following have been the highest priorities 
for you?  Please choose either one or two areas.”)  We did this to make sure we got 
variance, rather than allowing respondents to say they prioritized everything.  
This procedure generated self-reported values ranging from “1” to “5,” where 
“1”=the highest priority, either as stated initially or after the respondent was limited to 
two top priorities, “2”=second-highest priority as stated on the survey or initially 
presented as highest priority, but not among the top two chosen after the followup, and 
each other value moved down one notch (e.g. original “3” became “4”) to reflect this 
recoding.  To make interpretation more intuitive, all values have been reverse-coded.  
These answers do not allow us to take into account variation in how managers 
used a technique – managers may prioritize performance measurement, or trust building, 
in different ways. This is similar to a problem in evaluation research – using exposure to 
a broadly defined “treatment” such as participation in Head Start to examine its 
  22relationship with an outcome masks enormous differences in the content of Head Start 
programs (Light, Singer, and Willett 1990). However, this introduces noise, and thus 
depresses coefficients and p-values.  Similarly, we cannot distinguish whether a 
technique was used well, and skillful use presumably relates more to success.  Finally, 
the decision to prioritize a practice may have been influenced by perceived poor 
performance in the area; since what we care about is the influence of doing a better job 
with the management activity prioritized; if choices occurred to compensate for baseline 
bad performance, this would bias coefficients for the practice downward. 
Due to the way the Internet survey was set up, it was difficult to avoid answering 
a question, so we had few (between one and three) missing values. Values for these few 
were imputed so as not to lose an entire observation because of one missing value.
11  
Control Variables 
Factors at the local authority level other than a CDRP’s management practices 
may be related to crime performance. These include: (1) demographic characteristics
12; 
(2) general organizational capacity of the local government, which might make it easier 
for any local government organization, such as a CDRP, to succeed at anything it 
attempts, separate from specific practices of CDRP managers; (3) a greater level of social 
trust among people, which makes collaboration across organizations easier.
13   
Demographic variables  
                                                 
11 Though there were few non-responses, they were generally for different questions, so we would have 
lost about 25 respondents with no imputation.  Imputation was performed using the other management 
practice variables as predictors. 
12  Some demographic variables such as poverty are generally believed to be associated with levels of 
crime, but there is less reason to expect that demographic levels will be associated with crime levels 
controlling for past crime levels – as we do in our model – and thus in effect for changes in crime. 
13  For some of these control variables, we had missing values, occasionally as high as for 10% of the 
observations.  In these cases we imputed missing values, using the other control variables as predictors. 
  23We measured (1) population (log); (2) scores on a government-compiled Index of 
Relative Deprivation
14; (3) unemployment rate; (4) percentage of male teenagers in the 
population.  For most variables, data came from the 2001 census at the local authority 
level (coterminous with CDRP boundaries).  
Local Government General Organizational Capacity 
(1)  Comprehensive Performance Assessment score:  In 2002
 (2003 for district councils) 
the Audit Commission, a national body, first produced annual overall performance 
ratings for local authorities (Audit Commission 2005). We use the overall score for the 
first year these were available. Scores range from “1” (“poor”) to “4” (“excellent”).    
(2)  overall public satisfaction with local government:  We use data from a 2000 survey 
of residents in each local authority,
15 and use the percentage “very” or “fairly” satisfied. 
(3)  public satisfaction with local street cleanliness:  We use data from the same survey. 
(4) unitary authorities and district councils:   England has a mixed system of local 
government.  There are both “unitary” local authorities and “two-tier” ones (Wilson and 
Game 2006). Two-tier authorities, in sparsely populated areas, divide up local 
responsibilities into higher-tier county and lower-tier district councils. This is often 
regarded as making collaboration in a CDRP more difficult, because the CDRP exists at 
the lower level, but some partner organizations are at the upper one.  An observation is 
coded “1” if the authority is unitary, zero if part of a two-tier council. 
(5)  political stability: Democratic theory would suggest that greater partisan competition, 
which would produce lower party-political stability in the control of local government, 
would improve government performance by increasing rewards to performance. On the 
                                                 
14  This has frequently been used as a control variable in empirical research (e.g. Andrews et al 2005) on 
public management in the U.K.   
15 Accessed at http://www.neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk/dissemination/ 
  24other hand, partisan stability may create incentives for longer-term capacity-building 
efforts, such as creation of collaborative capacity, that don’t yield immediate results 
(O’Toole and Meier 2003). We measure political stability by first looking at for how 
many years between 2000-08 each party (Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrats, or 
another party) controlled the local council.
16  Our measure is the number of years the 
party with the longest period in power held power (BBC News 2009).
17   
Social Trust 
  There is some empirical literature (e.g. Glaeser et al 2000; Putnam 2007) 
suggesting that higher levels of diversity in a community are associated with lower social 
trust. This is consistent with literature on “outgroups” (Sherif et al 1961; Tajfel 1971; 
Brewer 1979), finding that people readily differentiate in- from out-groups, and that 
ingroup cooperation with outgroups is often difficult. There is also evidence (Putnam and 
Campbell 2010) frequent church attenders tend to be more trusting than others.
18 As 
proxies, we therefore measured (1) percentage Christian; (2) percentage Muslim; (3) 
percentage white; (4) percentage foreign born; (5) percentage attending church (Brierly 
2007); and (6) percentage minority employees in the local authority government (Audit 
Commission 2003).  Data for the first four measures come from the 2001 census.   
Effort 
In addition to control variables involving extra-CDRP influences, we also tested 
measures of overall CDRP level of effort. Our independent variables measure relative, 
                                                 
16 So if Labour was in control for 5 years, the Conservatives  2, and the Liberal Democrats l, the values 
would be Labour=5, Conservatives=2, Liberal Democrats=1. If no party had control for a given year, that 
year was not counted towards any party’s number of years. 
17 So in above example, the value of the variable would have been 5.  If there was a tie – e.g. Labour 4 
years, Conservatives 4 years, the value of the variable was the tie value (here, 4). 
18  This finding is confounded in U.S. data by the fact that Protestant fundamentalists tend to be high 
attenders and low trusters. 
  25not absolute, effort. Say that in one CDRP, the relative priority of practices A and B is 5 
(highest) and 1 (lowest), while in another it is 1 and 5. However, it is possible that overall 
effort in the first CDRP is so much higher than the second that actually more B was done 
in the first CDRP. Including effort allows us to compare the impact of prioritizing a 
practice, controlling for overall CDRP effort levels. We therefore tested for the impact of 
effort both as a main effect in the model and interacting with our treatment variables.
19 
Analytic Approach 
 
Testing for Interactions 
 
  It is plausible to believe that some management practices might be more effective 
in some background circumstances. For example, input-output thinking would suggest 
that presence of greater underlying social trust might allow for more-efficient 
transformation of a given level of a management inputs into crime-reduction outputs; in 
CDRP’s with higher levels of social trust, a given investment in promoting information 
sharing, say, might produce greater crime reduction. However, one might imagine the 
opposite, namely that underlying trust and investments to build trust are substitutes.  In 
this view, if there is high initial trust, prioritizing trust creation is less necessary, and 
might have a lower impact on crime than in places with low initial trust, where this 
priority might make a bigger difference.  One might also theorize some practices might 
work better in areas with larger population – for example, larger jurisdictions might do a 
better job transforming investments in performance measurement into crime reduction -- 
                                                 
19  We measured effort in several ways.  A question in the survey asked respondents to rate, on a 1-10 
scale, “the level of commitment” of several organizations “to partnership working in or with your CDRP.” 
The organizations listed were the police, fire service, probation service, health service, schools, city 
services, youth offending services, and the voluntary sector. We measured effort as commitment level of 
police only, probation only, and youth offending service only; also as a mean score for all three of these 
organizations and for all eight together. 
 
  26because greater size makes it easier to pay fixed costs of hiring staff to run these systems. 
Other examples might be that greater partisan stability might increase effectiveness of 
efforts to cultivate politicians, since one is more likely to be dealing with similar leaders 
over time. All these relationships would be hypothesized to create interaction effects.  
It is, however, difficult to have good a priori hypotheses – and there is no 
literature on this -- for the many effects one might speculate could be significant, for 
theorizing has been low and empirical testing even lower. This argues, in research such as 
this presenting some of the first empirical tests of the influence of management practices 
on collaborative success, for casting a wide net and testing many possible interactions.   
  On the other hand, researchers are often warned against “data mining” – doing a 
large number of tests on a dataset with no theoretical justification. A large number of 
tests creates the probability that, just by chance, at least some relationships will be 
significant.  Also, with our relatively small sample size, putting all potential interactions 
into one equation would be a recipe for insignificant p-values and multicollinearity. 
  In light of these tradeoffs, the following strategy was adopted:  (1) For all 
background variables possibly interacting with management priorities to explain crime, 
one-by-one interactions were run (including significant control variables); (2) We further 
examined interactions when the treatment interacted at the .1 level with at least two 
background variables, to guard against chance effects;
20 (3) We entered interactions thus 
produced in a stepwise regression (Efroymsom 1960) to eliminate insignificant ones.
21  
Endogeneity Issues 
                                                 
20  Since a number of the control variables examined -- percentages foreign born, Christian, Muslim, and 
white -- were highly correlated, we chose for further examination the one (percentage foreign born) with 
the largest number, by some margin, of significant one-by-one interactions. 
21  We tested both backward and forward elimination methods using STATA 9.2.  Both produced similar 
results, but the R2 for backward elimination was higher, so we used this technique. 
  27One of the issues in our ability to make inferences from current priorities is 
whether choice of priorities is endogenous -- rather than priorities causing changes in 
crime over time, changes in crime cause changes in priorities.
22  Although our dependent 
variable is current crime, values for this variable are influenced by changes in crime over 
time, creating potential endogeneity problems.   
We were most concerned about this possibility for prioritizing relations with the 
media. If crime goes down, managers may prioritize media relations more, because they 
have a better story to disseminate. Less plausibly, prioritizing relations with politicians 
might be similarly influenced.
 23 Any positive coefficient for the impact of prioritizing 
media relations, or perhaps those with politicians, might thus reflect endogeneity. 
The standard method for dealing with potential endogeneity is two-stage least 
squares regression (Greene 2007), using instrumental variables. We tested several 
measures of newspaper penetration at the local authority level as instruments, on the view 
higher penetration of local media would exogoneously be associated with greater 
prioritization of media relations, since the more-important the media, the more attractive 
it becomes to seek to influence coverage.
24 However, none proved to be acceptable 
instruments; all had F-statistics smaller than 10 in a first-stage regression. So we were 
forced to retain OLS.  However, differences in mean prioritization of both media and 
elected official relations between those who had changed priorities because they feared 
                                                 
22  Although our dependent variable is current crime and not change in crime, current crime is partly 
dependent in change in time over crime, so the potential endogeneity problem remains. 
23  If crime goes up, community safety managers might well be inclined to seek “cover” by prioritizing 
relations with politicians – but politicians would likely resist, making prioritization efforts self-limiting.  If 
crime goes down, politicians might seek to associate themselves with the CDRP, but this wouldn’t imply 
that the priority of relations with politicians for the community safety manager would increase. 
24  The measures of local media penetration we tested as instruments were (1)the total number of local 
newspapers in the local authority, (2)  the total circulation of the local newspapers, (2) the household 
penetration of the highest-circulation local paper.  Our data came from Newspaper Society (2010). 
  28not meeting targets and others (see below) was small – for media, almost non-existent – 
and statistically insignificant, arguing against endogeneity.   
There is a second way changes in crime might affect priorities. If performance is 
seen as unsatisfactory, managers might look to change priorities because previous ones 
weren’t working. Such behavior would correspond to the theory of problemistic search 
(Cyert and March 1963), which argues organizations continue existing practices unless 
faced with problems, at which point they search for new ones. Such changes, however, 
might well generate random reshuffling, but not create net movement on any of them. (If 
managers knew which practices worked, presumably they would have used them before 
performance deteriorated.) If bad crime performance simply randomly changes priorities, 
coefficients do not become biased.
25  However, for a number of the practices, one might 
make a priori arguments why managers might non-randomly change the priority if 
performance worsens. For example, managers might make building trust or encouraging 
information sharing higher priorities, because these have been so widely proposed as 
essential to partnership success and are thus more available for choice (Bazerman and 
Moore 2009). To the extent shifts among priorities in response to performance problems 
are non-random, this also creates endogeneity problems. Unfortunately, for practices 
about which we asked, no good potential instruments are available.  
Since we were aware of potential endogeneity when the survey was designed, we 
developed another technique to take account of it. In the survey, we asked respondents, 
“Have your priorities changed over the last year?”  We gave a number of alternatives, of 
which one was: “Yes, because we were concerned we will not meet our PSA [Public 
Service Agreement] targets.” 26 respondents checked this response. We then compared 
                                                 
25 This would create noise, making any results conservative. 
  29their mean values for prioritizing the different practices with those of other respondents. 
We found difference were statistically significant (at .1) for only one treatments (trust 
creation), a result no better than chance given we have 15 treatments, suggesting random 
redistribution of priorities.
26  We therefore present our results using all respondents. 
Testing for Interactions 
 
  It is plausible to believe that some management practices might be more effective 
in some background circumstances. For example, simple input-output thinking would 
suggest that presence of greater underlying social trust in a community might allow for 
more-efficient transformation of a given level of a management inputs into crime-
reduction outputs; in CDRP’s with higher levels of underlying trust, a given investment 
in promoting information sharing or reducing blockages might produce greater crime 
reduction. However, one might also imagine the opposite, that underlying trust and 
conscious investments to build trust serve as substitutes.  In this view, if there is high 
initial trust, prioritizing trust creation for conscious effort is less necessary, and might 
have a lower impact on crime than in places with low initial trust, where this priority 
might make a bigger difference changing trust across organizations.  One might also 
theorize a number of practices might work better in areas with larger population, because 
greater organizational capacity, made possible by larger population, might also make for 
more-efficient transformation of inputs into outputs. Larger jurisdictions might do a 
better job transforming investments in performance measurement into crime reduction, 
because greater size makes it easier to pay fixed costs of hiring staff to run these systems. 
Other examples might be that greater partisan stability might increase the effectiveness of 
                                                 
26  Even for trust, poorer crime performance was actually associated with lower prioritization, the opposite 
of our endogeneity worry, but creating the risk that coefficients might be inflated. 
  30efforts to cultivate politicians, since one is more likely to be dealing with similar leaders 
over time.  All these relationships would be hypothesized to create interaction effects.  
It is, however, difficult to have good a priori hypotheses for the many effects one 
might speculate could be significant, for theorizing has been low and empirical testing 
even lower. This argues, in research such as this that presents some of the first empirical 
tests of the influence of management practices on collaborative success, for casting a 
wide net and testing many possible interactions.   
  On the other hand, researchers are often warned against “data mining” – doing a 
large number of tests on a dataset with no theoretical justification. A large number of 
tests creates the probability that, just by chance, at least some relationships will be 
significant.  Also, with our relatively small sample size, putting all potential interactions 
into one equation would be a recipe for insignificant p-values and multicollinearity. 
  To deal with these tradeoffs, the following strategy was adopted:  (1) For all 
background variables believed on theoretical grounds to have possible interactions with 
management priorities in explaining crime reduction, one-by-one interaction regressions 
were run for each background variable with each treatment (along with the significant 
control variables);  (2) We only further examined interactions when the treatment 
significantly interacted at the .1 level with at least two background variables, to guard 
against chance effects;
27 (3) We entered all significant interactions thus produced into our 
model.  (4) We eliminated non-significant interactions one by one, until only significant 
ones remained; we retained these, subject to there being a plausible account, even if ex 
post, of why the effect was occurring. 
                                                 
27  Since a number of the control variables examined -- percentage foreign born, Christian, Muslim, and 
white, were highly correlated, we chose for further examination the one (percentage foreign born) with the 
largest number, by some margin, of significant one-by-one interactions. 
  31Other Data Analysis Issues 
We analyzed our data for non-response bias, comparing respondents and non-
respondents on our control variables.
28 We found non-respondents were from local 
authorities with significantly (.05 level) lower comprehensive performance assessment 
scores and higher political stability, and were less-likely to be from London, Wales, or 
lower-tier authorities, though differences in means were small. To correct for this, we 
performed weighting adjustments. We first ran a logistic regression with a dummy 
indicating either respondent/non-respondent as y, and characteristics differing between 
the groups as x’s. From the regression, we took the predicted probability of response for 
each observation and adjusted the regression by weighting each observation with the 
inverse of this predicted probability (Dey 1997).
29  
  We used OLS to analyze the data. We first ran the model with controls only, 
retaining only significant ones. We centered all but binary variables (London and 
Wales) around their mean values to reduce multicollinearity (Aiken and West 1991); no 
VIF score was greater than 3.7.  We use robust standard errors clustered by police 
force.
30  
 
 
                                                
 
RESULTS 
  Table 2 presents means and standard deviations for management priorities and 
other variables. Table 3 presents regression results. R2 is .70. Of control variables, only 
initial crime, population, and church attendance were significant as main effects. Thus, no
 
28  We were able to do this because we had values for these variables for all CDRP’s.   
29  There were no differences between respondents to the Internet and telephone surveys. 
30  Police districts for each CDRP are grouped into 42 contiguous forces, which have some common 
command structure. Clustering accounts for observations within each force not being independent but 
correlated in unknown ways. Robust standard errors adjust for possible heteroskedasticity in the error term.  
  32organization capacity variable, and only one demographic and social trust variable each
explained crime controlling for initial crime. Initial crime explained 48% of varian
while the other two control variables added a further 3%. Adding treat
, 
ce, 
ments and 
 a (quite large) additional 18% of the variance.   interactions explained
Hypothesis Testing  
  We find there are management practices associated with more success at reduc
crime, mostly exhibited through interaction effects such that a practice is effectiv
some circumstances but not others. There are also some practices that can make 
performance worse (there is a negative coefficient for the treatment); given that 
respondents were asked to prioritize practices compared with each other, this suggests
opportunity cost of choosing those and therefore spending less time on others, given 
management capacity is limited, is greater than benefits from the activity. (An alternative 
possibility is that a priority may have been selected because performance in that area
ing 
e in 
 the 
 was 
-
 
n, when 
seen as poor, which would, as noted earlier, would depress coefficients downward.) 
  Table 4 presents interpretations of our interaction results – coefficients for a one
unit change in the treatment at the mean value for the background variable, and at one
standard deviation below and above that variable’s mean.  Given that our dependent 
variable was log transformed, coefficients may be interpreted as percentage declines in 
crime associated with a one-unit treatment change (on a 1-5 scale). Table 5 indicates the 
percentage of CDRP’s, and the percentage of the total population living in those CDRP’s, 
where the sign of the treatment coefficient is positive. To simplify our presentatio
we say “crime decreases by x%,” we mean a one-unit change in the treatment is 
  33associated with a reduction of crime by that percentage; given the size of the standard 
deviation for treatments, such a change is somewhat more than one standard deviation. 
The most-dramatic finding is that the practices most consistently relating to bet
performance are ones associated with what we have called “hierarchy light.”  Priori
five of six such techniques predicts better results, at least in some circumstances. The 
strongest effect was for getting partners to deliver on commitments, which had the 
strongest impact on crime (a 2.6% reduction) for the average CDRP, and tied for the 
highest impact  (4.8% decline) where used under conditions making it particularly 
effective.  (This is in local authorities with a higher proportion of male teens, where 
cooperation among agencies is particularly crucial.)  The second-strongest effect was 
prioritizing removing “blockages.” It is associated, in local authorities with better ov
performance (high Comprehensive Performance Assessment scores), with a 3.8% crime 
reduction. In high CPA areas, individual organizations are effective, so working to 
unblock problems among them can make
ter 
tizing 
erall 
 a difference. However, as for other variables to 
be disc is 
 
, 
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ussed here, if used in unfavorable circumstances (low CPA), prioritizing th
practice has a negative impact on crime. 
Prioritizing performance measurement reduces crime if used in favorable 
circumstances – CDRP’s with larger populations and high CPA scores. For CDRP’s 
(outside London) with log population one standard deviation above the mean, crime goes
down by 2.8%. For CDRP’s in local authorities (outside London) with high CPA scores
it is associated with 1.9% decrease; well-performing organizations can better respond to 
needs for improvement that performance measurement suggests.
32 In CDRP’s at mean 
 
31  Except for some of the impacts of London and Wales. 
32  In London CDRP’s, prioritizing performance measurement hurt crime performance. 
  34population and CPA scores, prioritizing measurement has no effect. Prioritizing bidding
for government funds reduces crime 3.6% in po
 
litically more stable local authorities. A 
more p
reduces 
ve support 
can hel ted 
 
tments in 
olitically stable environment may make it easier to translate a CDRP’s access to 
funds to greater hierarchical-style influence.
33 
Outside London and Wales, prioritizing obtaining chief executive support 
crime in areas with a larger population. In CDRP’s outside London and Wales, it is 
associated with a 3% decrease in crime; larger governments are more difficult to 
coordinate, especially the many city services organizations, and chief executi
p avert entropy.
34  (We discuss below the positive impact of engaging elec
officials, which may also increase the CDRP’s quasi-hierarchical authority.) 
By contrast, prioritizing only two of five techniques used specifically for 
managing collaborations reduces crime, and some have a negative impact. As the 
literature predicts, prioritizing trust creation has a strong effect, especially in CDRP’s 
with lots of teens. On average, prioritizing trust creation reduces crime by 1.2%; in 
CDRP’s with a high percentage of teenagers, crime went down by 4.7% (in those with 
few teenagers, crime got worse), the second highest effect size we saw. Fighting youth
crime requires collaboration among agencies with different cultures, and inves
                                                 
33  It might hypothetically also make it easier to obtain funds, heightening results of the prioritization.  As 
predicted, prioritizing dealing with conflicts over dividing up government money hurt performance (exc
in London), especially in CDRP’s with many male teens. 
34  Prioritizing chief executive support also reduces crime in areas with
ept 
 fewer male teens and hurts in those 
tive support seems to create opportunity costs. 
with many teens. Collaboration regarding at-risk teens crucially involves two organizations, police and 
probation, not part of local government and thus not under chief executive influence; so in these places, 
prioritizing chief execu
  35trust building help.
35 Another “encouraging collaboration” practice, developing local 
initiatives, has a small positive effect (1% crime decrease), except in Wales.   
Prioritizing no other collaboration-style practice reduces crime, except fo
in London and Wales. Prioritizing the other technique for promoting voluntary 
cooperation, working to share power equitably, is associated with 
r some 
poorer performance 
(1.6% crime increase), except in London and Wales.
36  The other “promoting 
collaboration” practice, information sharing, has a very slightly negative effect 
everywhere but Wales, where it has a large negative effect. This is particularly 
notewo en 
e 
collaboration-management style approaches; in Wales, the positive impact of working for 
                                                
rthy given the high importance promotion of information sharing has been giv
as a collaboration management tool. Prioritizing communicating a vision has a negativ
effect (2.2% crime increase), except in London, where the impact is positive. These 
results presumably reflect the opportunity costs of prioritizing practices that don’t help. 
Positive effects in London of working for equitable treatment of partners, of 
communicating a vision, and even of managing conflicts over distribution of funds – 
along with the negative impact of prioritizing chief executive support
37 – suggest that 
overcoming challenges of managing in a big city’s fractious environment require more 
 
35  Given trust creation was prioritized more highly where crime went down, creating a risk of inflated 
coefficients, we examined the impact of trust among the 177 respondents with unchanged priorities, and 
found it to be similar. 
36 Some coefficients for interactions between London/Wales and priorities seem large, suggesting 
implausibly large impacts on crime.  For London, standard deviations of responses for the most-
suspiciously large-coefficient treatments (chief executive, equitable power distribution, and visioning) are 
noticeably smaller than for the non-London sample -- .59 vs. .87, 64 vs. .86, and .68 vs. .80 -- so a change 
in crime at one standard deviation becomes more reasonable with actual London respondents. For Wales, 
standard deviations are similar to the sample as a whole.  We also examined bivariate scatterplots of the 
treatment and change in crime, to see if one outlying observation was driving the relationship, given there 
were only 15 London and 18 Wales observations. Inspection did not show this to be important. With small 
subsample sizes, the likelihood that intra-London/Wales relationships are due to chance rises. 
37 Note that since London CDRP’s are generally in above-average population areas, and since there is a 
positive relationship between population size and the impact of prioritizing performance measurement, the 
negative coefficient would be lower for most actual London CDRP’s. 
  36equitable power sharing and the negative one of prioritizing chief executive support
link to a more egalitarian culture. In all, our results suggest collaboration-style techn
 may 
iques 
work b
 
 
 
rime areas, 
they ma
 media 
 the 
might reduce crime, and it may be easier to obtain such coverage where government 
                                                
etter in London and Wales, perhaps for different reasons.  One may speculate that 
large cities have been over-represented in research on cross-agency collaborations, 
perhaps producing a bias towards emphasizing special features of collaborations.
38
Prioritizing two of the three practices for engaging the external environment had
positive effects, at least under some conditions. Engaging politicians generally had a 
strong impact, especially in areas with high initial crime. On average, prioritizing
relations with elected officials reduced crime by 2%; where initial crime was high, the 
effect was 4.4%., our third-highest effect size. Plausibly, this occurs for two distinct 
reasons. Where crime is high, politicians may become more actively involved in 
mobilizing the community against crime. Additionally, especially in high-c
y put more pressure on individual organizations to work together in the CDRP, 
increasing the CDRP’s hierarchical authority. The role of elected officials in helping 
collaborations enhance such authority has not been noted in the literature.  
Additionally, for CDRP’s in well-performing local authorities, prioritizing
relations is associated with a 4.9% crime reduction, tied with prioritizing followup for
strongest effect size (for the average CDRP, this priority reduces crime by 1%, 
considerably lower than the mean effect of followup; crime went up where local 
authorities were poorly performing). We discussed earlier how good media coverage 
 
38  We note another pattern for Wales. For three of four treatments where Wales is different, the coefficient 
is negative. This suggests greater competition for management capacity, such that mistaken choices are not 
merely useless but crowd out useful activities, suggesting a capacity deficit compared with England. 
 
  37performs well generally and hence reporters are more likely to believe positively spun
stories. Together with the strong impact of prioritizing relations with politicians
 
, the 
finding about media suggests the importance of community mobilization for success, 
though this impact will depend on a partnership’s substantive area of activity.   
  None of our effort measures was neither significant as a main effect, nor did they 
significantly interact with any management practices in explaining crime reduction.
39   
However, initial crime was very important in explaining change in crime – the correlation 
between these two is .68.  The higher initial crime in a CDRP, the more crime went dow
This finding is qualitatively similar
n 
es 
ons 
90’s, 
e the 
                                                
40 to that reported by Zimring (2007) for differenc
in reduction in homicides in big cities and rural areas in the U.S. in the 1990’s.  Some of 
this is surely due to regression to the mean, but high initial crime areas are generally 
those one would expect, not ones randomly becoming so in 2002.
41 And crime reducti
have not always followed this pattern – for example, in New York City in the 19
where there was a uniform citywide anti-crime strategy, crime went down by similar 
percentages in both low and high crime areas (Farrell personal communication, 
11/19/2009).
42  It is plausible to believe that in CDRP’s, which unlike New York could 
develop varying approaches and commitment levels, overall effort increased wher
initial problem was worst.  By this measure, then, overall effort did likely affect CDRP 
success, an interesting finding with relevance for conclusions about the ability of 
 
39  Very few interactions were significant even done one-by-one.  We also tested for significant triple 
interactions involving the significant interactions involving the treatments.  For two of the specifications of 
effort, greater effort was associated with greater crime reduction if performance measurement was a 
priority in London, and for police effort, it was associated with greater success if information sharing was a 
priority in Wales. In neither case was the significance of other interactions affected. 
40   Zimring’s data (which divide jurisdictions only into two categories) do not permit calculation of a 
correlation like what we have for our data. 
41  Zimring looks at jurisdiction size, not initial crime, so regression to the mean isn’t an issue. 
42  Between 1993 and 2008, crime in the highest-crime precinct declined by 69% and in the lowest-crime 
precinct 80%. 
  38government to make progress on a problem based on greater effort at addressing it.  But 
our results for the management priorities already control for any overall effort impact of 
t 
many 
enerating 
e 
initial crime, since it appears as a main effect in our model, and there were no significan
interactions between initial crime and the treatments.  
  It is unlikely our results come from mere data mining.  We checked how 
significant interactions were obtained in simulations when we imposed a data- g
process reflecting the features of our data but imposing zero coefficients on the 
interactions. The goal was to see whether we would obtain as many significant 
interactions through a data mining process as in our model.
43 We ran the simulation 500 
times. In our model, we found 20 significant interactions at the .1 level or better; for th
simulation trials the average number was 8.2. Of the 500 trials, none had as many as 20 
interactions that were significant at .1. We also checked the number of interactions at 
other significance levels for 20 trials.
44  In our model, we found 11 interactions at .01 or 
better, for the trials 3.6; and 6 at .000 or better, for the trials 1.7.  
                                                 
43  To perform the simulation, we generated regression coefficients for the treatment and control variables 
from a model with main effects only. Then, using our real data for values for the treatments and controls, 
and these coefficients, we generated, for each observation, new values for y that were predicted by the 
overall coefficients for this model. These values, by construction, exclude any effects of interactions. To 
create the simulations, we then sampled our observations 203 times with replacement (each time we chose 
an observation, we "returned" it to the sample, so it had a chance to be sampled again). We then used actual 
data from this new sample, along with values for y we created, to test for interactions using the same 
stepwise method used in developing the model we present here, to see how many interactions were 
generated.  Any interactions generated are pure products of chance, since the method precluded genuine 
interactions. We are grateful to Alberto Abadie for suggesting this method; it is similar to one used in 
Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004).  
In a test with 20 trials where we examined the results manually, the simulated equations showed much 
higher multicollinearity than did our real model – for almost half the highest VIF score (with centered data) 
was over 10, ranging from 10.3 to 85.1, while for our real model, the highest was 3.7; this suggests 
interactions generated by the simulation are suspicious, unsurprising given these in fact were chance 
phenomena.  Even where the highest VIF was under 10, the maximum ranged from 4.4 to 9.9, with a mean 
of 6.8, well higher than the maximum VIF in our actual model. Indeed, though most texts use a cutoff point 
of 10 for serious multicollinearity concerns, at least one text (Menard 1995: 66) states that a maximum VIF 
over 5 is a “cause for concern.” Since we would not have used a real model with maximum VIF over 10, in 
the 500 trial simulation, we excluded through the programming instructions trials with such scores.  
44  These had to be checked by hand, so doing this 500 times would have been difficult. 
  39DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS 
  In finding there are certain practices followed by collaboration managers that are 
associated with greater success at achieving results, this study provides evidence for the 
broader proposition that interagency collaborations, properly managed, can improve 
public performance. Impacts on crime from the choice of more-effective practices are 
modest – a few percent – but investments in CDRP’s are also relatively modest, so it is 
likely the benefits of a well-managed collaboration outweigh the costs. 
Our study should be seen in the context of research on whether “management 
matters” (Lynn et al 2000; Meier and O’Toole 2002; Moynihan and Pandey 2005; 
Ingraham et al 2003) that hitherto has involved single organizations only.  We believe 
this is the first study providing evidence “management matters” collaborations.  
These findings also support arguments of those arguing effective management of 
collaborations is associated not with tools for managing collaborations specifically, but 
with those for managing any organization, along with techniques for engaging the 
external environment common for managing any government organization.   
Similar to the finding of Kelman and Myers (2011) that public executives 
successful at executing ambitious goal changes differed from those who tried but failed 
not in using change management techniques but in using general management ones, our 
findings suggest that if you want to be a good collaboration manager, you should be a 
good manager, period.  Furthermore, three treatments interacted with the local 
government’s overall performance rating, such that techniques for managing a 
collaboration worked better in an environment where single agencies worked better. 
Aside from effects of London and Wales, this produced our largest number of 
  40interactions. The local rating did not lower crime as a main effect; good individual 
agencies do not by themselves produce successful collaborations. But the interactions 
suggest that well-performing agencies create an environment where good management of 
a collaboration has more impact. This suggests that if you want collaborations among 
agencies to succeed, you need to worry about the health of the individual components. 
The hierarchical tools that work for collaborations are back-end ones, along with 
ones for gathering external resources and support, rather than front-end tools unavailable 
to them. However, without such “hierarchy light” tools, collaborations might fall victim 
to entropic and disintegrative forces that would reduce partner effort over time. The 
distinction between unavailable front-end tools -- such as hiring, task assignment, and 
work direction -- and those hierarchical tools that are available to collaborations has not 
heretofore been noted in the collaboration literature.  
The impact of engaging the external environment on improved performance – 
plausibly at least partly due to the community involvement in achieving the 
collaboration’s goals such engagement engenders -- is a second finding with implications 
for collaboration management. The ability to engage the community may be more 
available to interagency collaborations than to individual organizations, due to the greater 
legitimacy coming from the multiple constituencies different agencies represent.  Here, it 
may be easier for a CDRP to engage the community than for the police to do so by 
themselves.  Depending on the specifics of a collaboration’s agenda and the agencies 
composing it, this may provide an opportunity to which collaborations should attend. 
Our findings has prescriptive implications for managers. In an interesting study 
comparing the managerial behaviors of local emergency managers leading their own 
  41organizations with their behavior leading local emergency manager networks, Silvia and 
McGuire (2010) found that these managers made relatively far greater use of 
collaboration-specific techniques in managing collaborations and hierarchical-
management techniques in managing their own organizations.  Our findings suggest that 
managerial priorities may need to be rebalanced.
45 Furthermore, the many interactions we 
found allow us to offer advice: for example, though there is often a positive relationship 
between prioritizing performance measures and better results, managers in low-
population, or poorly performing, local authorities should not choose this priority.   
  Like all research, ours has limitations. Since our study is empirically located in a 
specific environment, we cannot be sure about its external validity -- our ability to use 
these results to give advice to other managers that selecting these priorities will improve 
the success of their collaboration. These results apply to a collaboration mostly inside 
government, where the police are a crucial partner. Hierarchy-like management 
techniques may be more effective in this than in other collaboration environments, also 
possibly limiting the external validity of these results.
46  
  An important potential limitation is that we only have data on current priorities, 
which may not be consistent with those of the past, creating measurement error. Ideally, 
we would like a measure of priorities for each year during the treatment period and then 
construct some sort of average measure. The near-impossibility of locating CDRP 
managers for the whole period made this approach infeasible; even had we such data, one 
could imagine many specifications for the best averaging method, none clearly correct.  
                                                 
45 The mean prioritization values for our CDRP managers in Table 2 (with no comparison to their behavior 
in other contexts) did show significant attention on average to these practices. 
46  We are grateful to Michael McGuire for suggesting this point. 
  42  There is evidence suggesting some persistence in priorities over time. We have 
surveys for a limited number (30) of a CDRP’s first community safety manager. Where 
we also had data for the corresponding current manager (22), we regressed for each 
practice the prioritization of the first manager on that of the current one, to see whether 
stability existed over time. Correlations were all positive,
47 and generally around .25, 
though, with our small sample size, only two were significant at .05 (performance 
measurement and bidding for funds) and another at .1 (information sharing).  We also 
noted the number of observations for which one or two of the highest priorities for 
managers during the two periods were the same, and compared this with the chance 
occurrence of the same priorities: the probability based on chance that the two managers 
shared at least one priority was 25.7%, while the actual probability was 40%; 10% of 
managers shared the same two top priorities (compared to a probability based on chance 
of less than 1%).
48  Furthermore, for all 30 observations we calculated a rank-order 
correlation of the means of the 15 treatments over time; the Spearman rho is a very high 
.65 (p=.008), suggesting there are certain priorities that, in general, are seen as more 
important (the way almost everybody would prioritize a lifetime of happiness over a 
single drink of water). For this reason, and also because at the individual observation 
level certain practices may be appropriate in certain CDRP environments and/or there 
may be path dependence, we see persistence over time. To the extent priorities are stable, 
those we measure in 2008 are a good proxy for those throughout the period. 
  Nonetheless, priorities are by no means fully stable. The correlations above are far 
from perfect. And when we asked current managers whether any priorities had changed 
                                                 
47  The only exception was the priority given dealing with managing conflicts over the use of funds. 
48  Exact calculations are available from the authors on request.  Doing these calculations was more 
complicated because some respondents had only one top priority, not two. 
  43over the previous year, 41% responded “yes.” By far the most-common reasons given 
were that national or local priorities had changed.
49  However, if, where priorities are not 
stable, the change is random or due to exogenous shocks (such as changed national or 
local government priorities are likely to be), our data on current priorities creates noise -- 
at the extreme, we know nothing about past priorities from current ones -- making our 
results conservative. If one alternatively assumes a problemistic search-based model of 
priority change over time as discussed earlier – where people choose priorities at random 
until they find one that works to reduce crime -- this will also generate conservative 
results. Assume the longer an impactful practice is prioritized, the greater its effect on 
crime.
50 For CDRP’s where the priority measured in our survey has an impact, these will 
be a mixture of those having used the practice for a long period and those adopting it only 
recently, meaning these current observations on average underreport the full impact of 
such priorities. By contrast, for practices with no impact, no period of use reduces crime. 
Assuming priorities change in response to failure, those at the end of the period still 
prioritizing non-impactful practices will have prioritized a series of such practices during 
the treatment period. Our results therefore underestimate the impact of priorities that 
reduce crime compared to those that do not, again making results conservative.
51 
  However, there are other possibilities for priority change that may bias results, as 
opposed to making them conservative. One is the endogeneity problem discussed earlier.  
                                                 
49  These responses suggest that respondents in the first instance were thinking about “priorities” in terms of 
specific CDRP activities – such as when the Home Office began promoting police/probation surveillance of 
“prolific and persistent offenders” – rather than priorities in the sense of management approaches from our 
survey.  It is hard to imagine, for example, that the central government started urging CDRP’s to put more 
emphasis on building trust or following up on commitments partners made. 
50  Or alternatively that it takes a certain number of years for the practice to have an impact, after which 
there is no additional impact. 
51  We are grateful to Joshua Goodman for conversations about this issue. 
  44An additional problem is that trust building or power equalization may be more important 
early in a partnership’s history, meaning that results for these practices based on current 
priority may underestimate their importance; indeed, one could argue that if these still 
need to be priorities a decade after a CDRP was established, it is a sign the partnership is 
in trouble. If this were true, this would bias coefficients for these practices based on our 
2008 data downward. (High priority in 2008 means a partnership in trouble, which in turn 
might be caused by worse crime performance.) More broadly, some respondents might 
choose to prioritize a practice – say, information sharing or performance measurement – 
out of a perception that the CDRP is performing poorly in that area, which might bias 
coefficients downward because it is not prioritization per se that reduces crime, but 
presence of the practice, and in some cases high prioritization might suggest low 
presence. If true, the size of the positive relationships we find would be conservative.  
We note that the coefficient for power sharing in our model is indeed generally 
negative, consistent with this worry, but that for trust building it is quite strongly positive 
– though perhaps absent a bias, the latter coefficient might be even higher.  This suggests 
that, at best, prioritizing power sharing contributes less to improved crime performance 
than does trust building. To examine this further, we first calculated the change in the 
mean prioritization for trust building and power sharing over time.
52  For both, it actually 
increased -- 0.2 unit for trust and 0.3 unit for power sharing (similar to a mean increase of 
0.2 unit for all 15 practices together
53). This is not consistent with the worry these would 
typically be higher priorities at the beginning of a partnership than later. However, we 
                                                 
52  We used all 30 first community safety managers and 203 current ones for whom we had data. 
53  This is possible because the only constraint for respondents was that they couldn't list more than two 
practices as top priorities; respondents could if they wished list all other practices in the second-highest 
priority category. The mean prioritization for two of the practices decreased over time. 
  45  46
                                                
also examined, for the 22 CDRP’s where we had both-period observations, the 
correlation between change in crime and change in prioritization.  For both cases, the 
correlation was negative (-.43 for power sharing and a weaker -.19 for trust building
54) -- 
for CDRP’s increasing the priority given these practices, crime performance was worse 
than for those that hadn’t. This is consistent with the suggestion that a CDRP that 
increases how much it prioritizes these practices is “in trouble.” We therefore would treat 
our negative coefficient for power sharing with caution.   
Despite any limitations, we believe this study is a good first step in empirical 
research on the impact of management practices on collaboration success.  If 
collaborative management is becoming as important as many argue, we will need more 
studies to develop paths we have begun to explore. 
 
 
54  P-values were .39 and .05 respectively.  
TABLE 1:  WORDING FOR MANAGEMENT PRIORITIES 
 
1.   building trust among partners (TRUST) 
2.   working hard to see to it that power is shared equitably in the Partnership (POWER SHARED) 
3.   communicating a vision of how partnership working can make our community safer. (VISION) 
4.   encouraging information sharing among partners (INFORMATION SHARING) 
5.   developing our own tailored initiatives, over and above central government initiatives (LOCAL INITIATIVES) 
6.   making sure there is follow-through on commitments partners make (FOLLOW-THROUGH) 
7.   dealing with blockages that are hurting the ability/willingness of partners to work together (BLOCKAGES) 
8.    implementing robust performance measurement/management (PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT) 
9.    obtaining access to central government funds (ACCESSING MONEY) 
10.  pressing partners to commit more staff effort to partnership work (MORE STAFF) 
11.  obtaining or retaining strong support from the Chief Executive for community safety work (CHIEF EXECUTIVE) 
12.  resolving issues and conflicts about how central government funds are to be allocated among partner organizations and 
activities (MONEY CONFLICTS) 
13.  nurturing good relations with elected members  (ELECTED OFFICIALS) 
14.  getting good media coverage for our initiatives (MEDIA) 
15.  nurturing good relations with the voluntary sector (VOLUNTARY SECTOR) 
 
  
TABLE 2:  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
 
Variable Mean  Std.  dev.  Min  Max 
Trust 3.9  0.8  2.0  5.0 
Power Shared Equally  2.9  0.8  1.0  5.0 
Vision 3.5  0.8  2.0  5.0 
Information Sharing  3.8  0.8  2.0  5.0 
Local Initiatives  3.6  0.7  2.0  5.0 
Follow-Through 3.7  0.7  2.0  5.0 
Blockages 3.8  0.9  2.0  5.0 
Performance Measurement  3.7  0.9  2.0  5.0 
Accessing Money  3.0  0.9  1.0  5.0 
More Staff  3.2  0.8  1.0  5.0 
Chief Executive  3.1  0.9  1.0  5.0 
Money Conflicts  3.0  0.9  1.0  5.0 
Elected Officials  3.2  0.7  2.0  5.0 
Media 3.4  0.8  1.0  5.0 
Volunteer Sector  3.0  0.6  1.0  4.0 
        
logInitial Crime  -3.0  0.5  - 3.9  -1.7 
logPopulation 11.7  0.6  7.7  13.8 
Church Attendance  6.4  2.2  3.0  19.0 
Local Authority Performance  2.6  0.9  -  4.0 
Political Stability  6.3  1.5  3.0  8.0 
London 0.1  0.3  -  1.0 
Wales 0.1  0.3  -  1.0 TABLE 3:  RESULTS OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR MANAGEMENT 
PRACTICES 
 
Log 2008 Crime  Coefficient  P>|t| 
TRUST 0.012  0.39 
POWER SHARED EQUALLY  -0.016  0.17 
VISION -0.022  0.13 
INFORMATION SHARING  -0.002  0.86 
LOCAL INITIATIVES  0.011  0.51 
FOLLOW-THROUGH 0.026  0.09 
BLOCKAGES 0.007  0.54 
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT -0.0008  0.95 
ACCESSING MONEY  -0.002  0.89 
MORE STAFF  -0.013  0.42 
CHIEF EXECUTIVE  0.008  0.62 
MONEY CONFLICTS  -0.020  0.10 
ELECTED OFFICIALS 0.021  0.23 
MEDIA 0.010  0.49 
VOLUNTARY SECTOR  -0.001  0.93 
logINITIAL CRIME X ELECTED OFFICIALS  0.051  0.06 
logPOPULATION X CHIEF EXECUTIVE  0.039  0.09 
logPOPULATION X PERFORMANCE MEASURES  0.050  0.02 
LOCAL AUTHORITY PERFORMANCE X BLOCKAGES  0.034  0.006 
LOCAL AUTHORITY PERFORMANCE X PERFORMANCE MEASURES 0.021  0.05 
LOCAL AUTHORITY PERFORMANCE X MEDIA  0.042  0.000 
POLITICAL STABILITY X ACCESSING MONEY  0.025  0.005 
%MALE TEENS X TRUST  0.060  0.05 
%MALE TEENS X  FOLLOW THROUGH  0.038  0.07 
% MALE TEENS X MONEY CONFLICTS  -0.044  0.02 
% MALE TEENS X CHIEF EXECUTIVE  -0.070  0.05 
LONDON X POWER SHARED  0.167  0.000 
LONDON X CHIEF EXECUTIVE  -0.170  0.000 
LONDON X MONEY CONFLICTS  0.064  0.009 
LONDON X PERFORMANCE MEASURES  -0.067  0.04 
LONDON X VISION  0.153  0.000 
WALES X INFO SHARING  -0.164  0.000 
WALES X POWER SHARED  0.166  0.000 
WALES X CHIEF EXECUTIVE  -0.061  0.01 
WALES X LOCAL INITIATIVES  -0.136  0.002 
LOCAL AUTHORITY PERFORMANCE  0.013  0.21 
POLITICAL STABILITY  -0.002  0.69 
% MALE TEENS  0.014  0.48 
LONDON 0.130  0.001 
WALES 0.036  0.32 
CHURCH ATTENDANCE  0.014  0.05 
logINITIAL CRIME  0.269  0.000 
logPOPULATION 0.027  0.26 
CONSTANT 0.3472  0.308 
Number of obs  =  203 
R-squared     =  0.70 
  
  
TABLE 4: COEFFICIENTS FOR IMPACTS OF VARIABLES, WITH INTERACTIONS AT MEAN, ONE STANDARD 
DEVIATION ABOVE/BELOW MEAN 
 
  At 
1 S.D. below mean
At 
Mean 
At 
1 S.D. above mean 
FOLLOW THROUGH  0.004  0.026  0.048 
BLOCKAGES -0.024  0.007  0.038 
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT (Outside London)       
Local Authority Performance   -0.020 -0.001  0.019 
logPopulation  -0.029 -0.001  0.028 
ACCESSING MONEY  -0.040  -0.002  0.036 
CHIEF EXECUTIVE (Outside London & Wales)       
logPopulation   -0.015  0.008  0.030 
% Male Teens   0.048  0.008  -0.033 
MONEY CONFLICTS (Outside London)  0.006  -0.020  -0.046 
TRUST -0.023  0.012  0.047 
ELECTED OFFICIALS  -0.002  0.021  0.044 
MEDIA -0.028  0.010  0.049 
 
 
 TABLE 5:  CDRP’S WITH POSITIVE SIGN FOR COEFFICIENT FOR TREATMENT 
 
 
 
  Proportion of CDRPs  Proportion of Population 
Trust 72%  77% 
Power Shared Equally  16%  19% 
Vision 7%  11% 
Information Sharing  0.%  0% 
Local Initiatives  91%  92% 
Follow-Through 956%  96% 
Blockages 58%  59% 
Performance Measurement  44%  58% 
Accessing Money  46%  43% 
More Staff  0.%  0% 
Chief Executive  53%  61% 
Money Conflicts  13%  15% 
Elected Officials  81%  88% 
Media 58%  59% 
Voluntary Sector  0.%  0% 
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